Ever since the adoption of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant1 -the very first instrument that implemented the mutual recognition principle in the criminal law context -the relationship between the effectiveness of this instrument and the proper protection of fundamental rights have been widely and fiercely discussed. The stormy debates have calmed down a little since the Court of Justice of the eu (hereinafter: 'cjeu' or the 'Court') handed down its judgment in the joined cases of Aranyosi and Căldăraru; for the first time since the birth of the European Arrest Warrant (hereinafter: eaw) regime, the Court has accepted that in cases of a serious risk of inhumane treatment in the issuing Member State's prisons, surrender proceedings in the executing Member State must be suspended until sufficient supplementary information discounts that risk, and can eventually -i.e. where such 104 supplementary information is not obtained within a reasonable time -be brought to an end.2
The Court's judgment in Aranyosi/Căldăraru has widely been interpreted as marking or, at least, confirming that the cjeu has started to follow a new avenue in eaw cases: the avenue of a restored balance between effective enforcement and adequate protection of fundamental rights.3 But what no one seems to have been wondering so far is whether the -comparatively speakingsmallness of the criminal offences underlying the eaw's in those cases may also have worked out to the advantage of fundamental rights protection.
With particular attention for the gravity of the offences at hand, the following aims to describe and contrast two cases in which the Court was asked to decide on the scope of mutual trust in relation to fundamental rights concerns on the part of the issuing Member States. Two judgments have been selected: first, the abovementioned judgment in the joined cases of Aranyosi and Căldăraru, and secondly, the Court's judgment in the case of Lanigan on time-limits and the right to liberty. What these cases have in common is their primary focus on the functioning of mutual trust and mutual recognition in relation to core fundamental rights. In my view, this makes these cases different from other cjeu judgments that primarily deal with the interpretation of technical-legal terms laid down in the eaw Framework Decision,4 or that question the hierarchy between eu-level norms and national constitutional rights.5 True as it may be that the Court's decisions in these other cases have an impact on the scope of procedural rights and fundamental rights, and as such on the level of rights protection in eaw cases, these other judgments do not as such question the scope of mutual trust in cases where the issuing of an eaw (allegedly) violates core eu-level fundamental rights. This, however, has been the main question in the selected cases of Aranyosi/Căldăraru and Lanigan, which makes both cases eligible for comparison in the framework of this editorial.
In Aranyosi/Căldăraru, the Court has been found ready to accept an exemption from the obligation to swiftly recognise eaw's without assessing the protection of fundamental rights in the issuing Member State's criminal justice system. In these cases, the executing Member State (Germany) had to decide, first, on the surrender of an Hungarian national (Aranyosi) whose surrender was sought by Hungary in relation to the forced entry into a dwelling house from which he allegedly stole various objects of value as well as approximately eur 2.813 in cash, and the entering by a window of a school in which he forced the opening of doors and from which he allegedly stole technical equipment and cash money with a total value of approximately eur 930.6 The second eaw came from Romania and related to a Romanian national (Căldăraru) whose surrender was sought for the purpose of executing a final sentence of one year and eight months imprisonment, imposed for the offence of driving without a driving license.7 The German authorities wondered whether the poor detention conditions in both Hungary and Romania would constitute a ground for non-execution of the eaw's.
The Court explicitly held that evidence of deficiencies with respect to prison conditions in the issuing Member States requires the executing Member State to assess into detail the likelihood that the individuals concerned will be exposed to inhumane or degrading treatment after their surrender to the issuing Member States.8 The executing Member State's finding that there is a real risk ('substantial grounds to believe') of such an inhumane and degrading treatment must result in a postponement of the surrender proceedings ('it cannot be abandoned'), until the issuing Member State on urgent request of the executing Member State has obtained all necessary supplementary information on the conditions the sought person is envisaged to be detained after surrender.9 It is true that the Court has remained rather vague on the precise consequences if the risk of inhumane and degrading treatment cannot be discounted within a reasonable time; it obviously tried to avoid using the terms 'refusal' and 'non-execution' , and held that in such a case the executing Member State 'must decide whether the surrender procedure should be brought to an end' .10 But the fact remains -and this is a novelty -that the Court has explicitly accepted room for the executing Member State to carry out an intermediate check on the actual level of fundamental rights protection in the issuing Member State, thereby allowing for a rebuttal of mutual trust in the context of eaw proceedings.
While not denying the importance of the Court's ruling in Aranyosi/Căldăraru, I have been wondering whether the, comparatively speaking, smallness of the criminal offences that were underlying the Hungarian and Romanian eaw's may have impacted to some extent on the Court's decision to accept the possibility for rebuttal of the mutual trust principle -the very foundation of the mutual recognition model after all. Intuitively, one may be inclined to answer this question in the negative since on a principled level a core fundamental right, such as the right not be exposed to inhumane or degrading treatments in detention, must be safeguarded, irrespective of the criminal offence at hand. And indeed, I would not dare to suggest that the nature of the offences in the cases of Aranyosi and Căldăraru would have been a very explicit matter of significance in the Court's deliberations in these cases. But perhaps the question seems less strange, and less provocative, would it be turned around: would the Court have been ready to deliver this ruling if Aranyosi's prosecution would have been sought for several brutal murders, and if Căldăraru's prison sentence would have been imposed because he was found guilty of terrorist attacks? Moreover, how unlikely is it that the Court's choice for postponement instead of non-execution, at least on the short-term, relates to the possibility that future similar eaw cases may deal with much more serious offences? In my view, the issue becomes even less far-fetched if we compare the aforementioned ruling with the Court's ruling in the case of Lanigan.11 In this case, the Court had to deal with two questions, first whether non-compliance with the time-limits would exempt the executing Member State (in this case Ireland) from its obligation to adopt a decision on the issuing Member State's (United Kingdom) request for surrender; and, second, whether the expiry of time-limits should have consequences for the continuation of custody.12 At the time the High Court of Ireland referred its questions to the cjeu, almost two years had passed since the issuing of the eaw -whereas pursuant to Article 17 of the Framework Decision eaw a final decision is required within 90 days.13 During almost all that time, Lanigan, who was arrested one month after the receipt of the eaw, had been held in custody.14 The cjeu ruling in this case has been welcomed by some, in particular because of its decision on the second question: although the Court has held that exceeding the time-limits must not automatically result in the (provisional) release of the sought person,15 it explicitly stated that any decision taken on the sought person's custody or release while awaiting the final decision on surrender, must comply with the right to liberty as laid down in Article 6 of the eu Charter of Fundamental Rights.16 It has been argued that in its ruling in Lanigan -i.e. by its reference to the requirement of compliance with Article 6 of the eu Charter -the Court has for the first time expressly allowed a fundamental rights check in the executing Member State.17 But as to this issue, one can disagree on how novel the Lanigan judgment actually is. After all, would the Court really have been able to stipulate a lower level of protection regarding the right of liberty than it currently does? Of course not. Such a decision would boil down to rule out the applicability of the Strasbourg right to liberty-standards (included in Article 6 of the eu Charter) to keeping a person 
